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Data mining is a key technology in big data analytics and it can discover understandable knowl-
edge (patterns) hidden in large data sets. Association rule is one of the most useful knowledge
patterns, and a large number of algorithms have been developed in the data mining literature to
generate association rules corresponding to different problems and situations. Privacy becomes a
vital issue when data mining is used to sensitive data sets like medical records, commercial data sets
and national security. In this Letter, we present a quantum protocol for mining association rules
on vertically partitioned databases. The quantum protocol can significantly improve the privacy
level preserved by known classical protocols and at the same time it can exponentially reduce the
computational complexity and communication cost.
I. Introduction.— Numerous data mining techniques
have been developed for discovering various knowledge
patterns, using methods from statistics, machine learn-
ing, artificial intelligence and database systems. In this
Letter, we focus on mining of association rules, one of
the simplest but most useful knowledge patterns. An
association rule is a relation between two disjoint sets of
items. Suppose I is a set of items. An association rule is a
probabilistic implicationX ⇒ Y , whereX and Y are two
disjoint subsets of I with both the support (frequency) of
X ∪ Y and the confidence of X ⇒ Y being greater than
preset values. The task of mining association rules is to
find all such rules in a large database [1]. Mining asso-
ciation rules or association analysis was first introduced
in [2] to find significant and useful relations between sets
of items among a large collection of transactions in a su-
permarket. Since then, it has been very successfully ap-
plied in various areas including bioinformatics, medical
diagnosis, market basket problem, inventory control, risk
management, Web mining, telecommunication networks,
earth science, scientific data analysis [1, 3].
A key issue in the real-world applications of these tech-
niques is how to protect privacy in data mining. In the
last 15 years, several privacy-preserving algorithms for
mining association rules have been proposed [4]. Two
typical scenarios of privacy-preserving data mining are:
(1) Discover statistical knowledge (e.g. frequency and
confidence) with individual information being preserved;
for example an algorithm was suggested in [5] for mining
customers’ behaviour in a supermarket while the per-
sonal behaviour of a customer is preserved. (2) Mine on
a database that belongs to two or more parties, called a
vertically partitioned database, but protect each party’s
privacy [6–8].
In this Letter, we propose a quantum privacy-
preserving method for mining association rules on verti-
cally partitioned databases. Our method is based on the
model of Quantum Random Access Memory (QRAM),
a quantum generalization of Random Access Memory
(RAM). QRAM was first introduced in [9], and its phys-
ical architecture was proposed in [10]. It was applied to
define a quantum support vector machine for big data
classification that can achieve an exponential speedup
over classical algorithms [11]. Another interesting ap-
plication of QRAM is quantum private queries [12] that
can detect whether the database provider cheats. The
method presented in this Letter provides a new applica-
tion of QRAM to one of the most researched problems in
big data analytics, namely data mining association rules.
This method can preserve the privacy much better than
known classical protocols, and meanwhile exponentially
reduce the computational complexity and communica-
tion cost.
II. Privacy-Preserving Mining of Association Rules.—
Let us first formally define the problem of mining associ-
ation rules in a database. Suppose I = {I1, · · · , Ik} is a
set of items (or attributes), and D = {D0, · · · , DN−1} is
a database, where each Di ⊆ I represents a transaction,
which is, e.g. the set of items that one customer buys
in one purchase. An itemset X is a subset of I, and its
support is defined as supp(X) = |{j : X ⊆ Dj}|/N . The
intuitive meaning of supp(X) is the frequency that X
appears in all transactions. A rule is a relation X ⇒ Y ,
meaning that itemset X implies itemset Y , where X and
Y are both itemsets with X ∩ Y = ∅. Its confidence
is defined as conf(X ⇒ Y ) = supp(X ∪ Y )/supp(X),
which is actually the conditional probability Pr(Y |X).
The mining problem is as follows: Given s > 0 and c > 0,
find all pairs (X,Y ) with X ∩ Y = ∅, supp(X ∪ Y ) > s
and conf(X ⇒ Y ) > c. This problem can be solved
in two steps: firstly, we find all itemsets Z such that
supp(Z) > s, called frequent itemsets; secondly, we find
all disjoint partitions X ∪Y = Z with conf(X ⇒ Y ) > c,
for every frequent itemset Z. Both of the steps can be
done by a level-wise algorithm; for example the Apriori
algorithm [13] first generates all 1-itemsets, i.e., itemsets
with only 1 item. Then it generates all m-itemsets from
all (m− 1)-itemsets.
Now assume that the database D is vertically parti-
tioned into two disjoint parts D1 and D2 belonging to
2two parties: the set I of items (or attributes) is divided
to I1 = {I1, · · · , Il} and I2 = {Il+1, · · · , Ik} (1 ≤ l < k).
Alice owns (sub-)database D1 = {D10, · · · , D
1
N−1} of I
1,
and Bob owns (sub-)database D2 = {D20, · · · , D
2
N−1}
of I2, where each transaction Dj in D is divided into
D1j ⊆ I
1 and D2j ⊆ I
2 with Dj = D
1
j ∪ D
2
j . Then
the privacy-preserving task is to mine association rules
from D1 and D2 (e.g. compute the support of an itemset
Z ⊆ I with Z1 = Z ∩ I1 6= ∅ and Z2 = Z ∩ I2 6= ∅), but
Alice and Bob’s private information must be preserved;
that is, Bob (resp. Alice) is not allowed to know either
the exact value of D1j (resp. D
2
j ) or whether D
1
j ⊇ Z
1
(resp. D2j ⊇ Z
2).
Two classes of protocols have been developed in the lit-
erature for privacy-preserving data mining on vertically
partitioned databases. The first class adds noise to the
data before transmitted, but the noise will be removed
from the final results [7]. The second class employs hash
functions and encryptions [6, 8].
III. Quantum Database.— The aim of this Letter is
to present a quantum protocol for privacy-preserving
data mining. Before doing it, let us develop a quan-
tum database model based on Quantum Random Access
Memory (QRAM) [9]. A QRAM can realize the following
transform:
∑
αj |j〉|0〉 →
∑
αj |j〉|τj〉,
where τj is the content in the j-th memory cell of the
QRAM; that is, if we input the address qubits |ψ〉 =∑
αj |j〉with some blank data qubits, the QRAM outputs
a superposition of some orthogonal quantum states which
represent both address and data.
Note that in [10], the query of a QRAM is physically
implemented by a set of controlled-NOT gates. As a
consequence, querying the database twice with the same
query will erase the data obtained in the first query. This
feature will play a key role in our protocol.
Now we see how to store the partition D1 and D2
of database D into QRAMs. We use a boolean string
dj = dj,1 · · · dj,k to represent each transaction Dj , where
dj,i = 1 if and only if Ii ∈ Dj for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Fur-
thermore, the string dj is divided into two substrings:
d1j = dj,1 · · · dj,l for Alice and d
2
j = dj,l+1 · · · dj,k for Bob.
At Alice’s (resp. Bob’s) side, d1j (resp. d
2
j ) is stored in
QRAM QD1 (resp. QD2). For convenience, we assume
that N = 2n for some integer n; otherwise we can add
blank dj .
IV. Quantum Protocol for Mining Association Rules.—
We are now ready to present our quantum protocol. The
basic idea is to employ the quantum counting algorithm
Count in [14] to compute supp(Z) for any itemset Z.
Recall that for a function c : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, Count
computes the number of j with c(j) = 1. The key com-
ponent of Count is a controlled unitary called GC :
|m〉 ⊗ |j〉 → |m〉 ⊗Gm|j〉, 0 ≤ m ≤ P − 1
where P is an integer that determines the precision of
the computation, G = −WU0WU is the Grover iteration,
W = H⊗n consists of n Hadamard gates, and U0 = σ
⊗n
I −
2|~0〉〈~0| with σI being the identity operator and |~0〉 =
|0〉⊗n, and
U : |j〉 → (−1)c(j)|j〉 (1)
is the oracle.
Note that to implement GC , we need to perform P
controlled-G operations, which in turn requires applica-
tions of controlled-U operations. The main part of our
protocol is devoted to the implementation of such a con-
trolled oracle. For simplicity, we first implement U , the
uncontrolled oracle, and then show how to adjust the
protocol easily for the controlled one.
1. Implementing the oracle U : The protocol starts
with Alice. Suppose she holds the state
∑
αj |j〉.
Step 1: Alice sends the state to Bob, and then Bob
performs an encryption operator EB :
∑
αj |j〉
EB−−→
∑
αj |u(j)〉
on it, where u is a bijection on {0, 1}n chosen secretly
by Bob. This choice of EB is rather arbitrary; it can
be, for instance, bit flip: u(j) = j ⊕ λ or addition:
u(j) = j + λ mod N for a fixed λ ∈ {0, 1}n, or cyclic
function: u(j1 · · · jn) = j2 · · · jnj1. These kinds of EB
can be implemented by applying O(n) σX , CNOT and
Toffoli gates. The introduction of encryption operator is
for the purpose of protecting Bob’s privacy from Alice;
we will discuss this issue later in more detail.
Step 2: Bob queries his database QD2 using the en-
crypted address qubits, applies UZ which is responsible
for testing if the itemset Z is contained in a transac-
tion, and then query his database again to erase the
data, thanks to the fact that QRAM is implemented by
controlled-NOT gates. In effect, Bob makes the following
transitions:
∑
αj |u(j)〉
QB
−−→
∑
αj |u(j)〉|d
2
u(j)〉
UZ−−→
∑
αj |u(j)〉|d
2
u(j)〉|bj〉
QB
−−→
∑
αj |u(j)〉|bj〉
where bj = gZ(d
2
u(j)), UZ : |x〉|y〉 → |x〉|y ⊕ gZ(x)〉, and
gZ(x) = 1 if and only if X ⊇ Z2 withX being the itemset
represented by the boolean string x. For simplicity, we
omit the auxiliary qubits in the above transitions when
they are disentangled from the main systems and set back
to their initial states.
Note that the query operation QB costs O(k logN)
time [10]. For UZ , it can be implemented in O(k) [15].
Thus the total time cost of this step is O(k logN).
Step 3: Bob sends back the address qubits and the
qubit containing the bj information to Alice. The task
for Alice in this step is similar to Bob in Step 2:
∑
αj |u(j)〉|bj〉
QA
−−→
∑
αj |u(j)〉|bj〉|d
1
u(j)〉
VZ−−→
∑
αj |u(j)〉|bj〉|d
1
u(j)〉|aj〉
QA
−−→
∑
αj |u(j)〉|bj〉|aj〉
3where aj = fZ(d
1
u(j)) and VZ is defined similar to UZ but
for Z1. Again, this step costs O(k logN) time.
Step 4: Alice computes ajbj for each j by first intro-
ducing an ancillary qubit initialised into |−〉, and then
applying Toffoli gate with the ancillary qubit being tar-
get while the last two qubits from Step 3 being control
qubits. In effect, she makes the transition:
∑
αj |u(j)〉|bj〉|aj〉
TA−−→
∑
(−1)cu(j)αj |u(j)〉|bj〉|aj〉
where cu(j) = ajbj.
Step 5: Alice erases the information aj by performing
the operations in Step 3 again. This leads to
∑
(−1)cu(j)αj |u(j)〉|bj〉|aj〉
QAVZQA
−−−−−−→
∑
(−1)cu(j)αj |u(j)〉|bj〉
Actually, we can simplified the protocol a little bit by
postponing the unquery of QA in Step 3 to this step.
This will save two applications of QA.
Step 6: Alice sends the systems obtained in the above
step to Bob, who erases the information bj by performing
the operations in Step 2 again:
∑
(−1)cu(j)αj |u(j)|bj〉
QBUZQB
−−−−−−→
∑
(−1)cu(j)αj |u(j)〉
Step 7: Bob undoes the encryption by performing E†B:
∑
(−1)cu(j)αj |u(j)〉
E
†
B−−→
∑
(−1)cu(j)αj |j〉
and sends the systems back to Alice. In this way the
oracle U defined in Eq.(1) has been implemented. Note
that for the EB chosen in Step 1, E
†
B can be implemented
in time O(n) as well.
We display the state evolution in the above steps in Ta-
ble I, which should help the reader to better understand
the construction.
2. Implementing the oracle controlled-G. As said be-
fore, to make use of the quantum counting algorithm,
TABLE I. State evolution in Steps 1 through 7, where UA =
QAVZQA and UB = QBUZQB. The subscriptions indicate
which party the qubits belong to.
Step State after the step
Init
∑
j
αj |j〉A
1 EB
∑
j
αj |u(j)〉B
2 UB
∑
j
αj |u(j), bj〉B
3 UA
∑
j
αj |u(j), bj , aj〉A
4 TA
∑
j
(−1)cu(j)αj |u(j), bj , aj〉A
5 UA
∑
j
(−1)cu(j)αj |u(j), bj〉A
6 UB
∑
j
(−1)cu(j)αj |u(j)〉B
7 E†B
∑
j
(−1)cu(j)αj |j〉A
we need to implement the controlled-G operation where
G = −WU0WU . To this end, we need to modify the
above protocol for U to implement controlled-U . Fortu-
nately, this turns out to be very easy. Denote by q the
control qubit of the controlled-U we are going to imple-
ment. We only need to replace the Toffoli gate used in
Step 4 by a controlled-Toffoli gate, with q being the ad-
ditional control qubit. The reason is, if Step 4 is missing,
then the effects of the other 6 steps cancel each other.
Similarly, to implement controlled-WU0W , we need
only to construct controlled-U0. It is easy to see that
the total complexity of implementing controlled-G is still
O(k logN).
3. Computing the support : So far we described the
protocol when it is initialised by Alice. The protocol
initialised by Bob can be similarly defined, which im-
plements controlled-G′ for Bob. Now the support of an
itemset Z can be computed as follows:
1. Alice runs Count with controlled-G as the oracle.
2. Bob runs Count with controlled-G′ as the oracle.
3. Alice and Bob announce their results s1 and s2. If
|s1− s2| < 0.01s, where s is the preset threshold of
support, they accept s1+s22 as the value of supp(Z).
Otherwise they restart the protocol.
One constraint for Count is that it can not distin-
guish between supp(Z) and 1−supp(Z). Thus we assume
supp(Z) < 12 , as in [14]. This assumption is reasonable
for most applications (e.g. mining customers’ behaviour
in a supermarket). By [14, Theorem 5], Bob can em-
ploy Count to compute supp(Z) with error smaller than
2pi
P
√
supp(Z) + pi
2
P 2
≤ 2pi
P
+ pi
2
P 2
and success probability
greater than 8
pi2
. If we set P ≈ 2000/s, the error will
be smaller than 0.005s. At the end of each round of
this protocol, the probability that both s1 and s2 are in
the interval (s0 − 0.005s, s0 + 0.005s) are greater than
( 8
pi2
)2 > 0.64, where s0 = supp(Z). Thus the terminat-
ing probability of each round is at least 0.64, and the
expected number of rounds is smaller than 2. Further-
more,
Pr(|
s1 + s2
2
− s0| > 0.01s ∧ |s1 − s2| < 0.01s)
< (1−
8
π2
)2 < 0.04.
Therefore, once the whole protocol terminates, it com-
putes supp(Z) with error smaller than 0.01s and success
probability greater than 0.640.64+0.04 > 0.9.
4. Computing the confidence: Since we can compute
the supports supp(X) and supp(X ∪ Y ), the confidence
conf(X ⇒ Y ) = supp(X ∪ Y )/supp(X) can be calcu-
lated with an error approximately equal to the sum of
the errors of computing supp(X ∪ Y ) and supp(X).
V. Analysis of the Quantum Protocol.— We now show
that the quantum protocol presented above significantly
improves the privacy, complexity and communication
cost of known classical algorithms.
41. Privacy: We only consider the semi-honest model
where both Alice and Bob follow the protocol, but may
use the residual (classical as well as quantum) informa-
tion after executing the protocol to extract the other
party’s private information [6, 8].
Note that in [6, 8], to compute the support of Z se-
cretly, Alice and Bob make use of commutative bijec-
tions uA and uB, respectively, to encode the messages
communicated between them: Alice first sends uA(S1) =
{uA(i) : i ∈ S1} to Bob, where S1 = {i : Z1 ⊆ D1i }.
Then Bob sends back uB(uA(S1)) to Alice. Following
the similar way but initialised by Bob, Alice and Bob
can share uA(uB(S2)) where S2 = {i : Z2 ⊆ D2i }. Then
they both compute
supp(Z) =
|S1 ∩ S2|
N
=
|uB(uA(S1)) ∩ uA(uB(S2))|
N
.
A common choice of uA and uB is uA(x) ≡ x
eA mod p
and uB(x) ≡ xeB mod p where p > N is a prime num-
ber, and eA and eB are coprime to p − 1 and chosen
from {3, 5, · · · , p − 2}. It has been proven secure if the
attack is only allowed in polynomial time with respect
to n and k [6]. However, when exponential time is per-
mitted, then, say, Bob’s data can be disclosed by Alice if
she tries all possibilities of eB, and compares the received
uA(uB(S1)) (= uB(uA(S1))) with her own uA(S1). For
example if p = 11, eA = 9, eB = 3 and S1 = {2, 8},
then uA(S1) = {6, 7} and uA(uB(S1)) = {2, 7}. Since
only w = 3 satisfies {6w mod 11, 7w mod 11} = {2, 7},
eB = 3 can be easily found, and Alice knows S2 com-
pletely.
Compared to classical ones, our quantum protocol can
better protect the participants’ private information. Let
us analyse the protocol initialised by Alice (the one we
described in detail) as an example. From Table I, Al-
ice does not send her information aj to Bob, so Alice’s
privacy is protected perfectly. For Bob’s privacy, note
that at the end of the Count algorithm, Alice gets a
(unnormalized) state
|κ0〉 =
∑
cu(j)=0
αj |j〉 or |κ1〉 =
∑
cu(j)=1
αj |j〉,
depending on the measurement result. Now the best way
she can do to extract Bob’s private information is to fur-
ther measure the state according to the computational
basis (that is, {|j〉 : j = 0, . . . , N − 1}). Let the mea-
surement outcome be j0. Then she knows cu(j0) for sure.
However, as u is a bijection which is chosen secretly by
Bob (Alice does not know, say, whether u is a bit flip or
an addition, how to choose λ in each type, etc), this kind
of information cu(j0) is totally useless for Alice. Note that
if the encryption u was not employed, then Alice gets the
value cj0 , and she can deduce whether Z
2 ⊆ D2j0 by using
her own information of whether Z1 ⊆ D1j0 .
2. Time complexity: The time cost of our protocol
comes mainly from expected two (≈ 1/0.64) rounds of
P calls of the controlled-G operation, which we have
shown to be O(k logN)-time implementable, and the
Fourier transform in Count, which costs O(log2 P ) of
time [14, 16]. As we have set P ≈ 2000/s and the preset
support threshold s is usually a constant [2], the total
computational complexity of our protocol is O(k logN).
In contrast, a typical classical protocol needs Ω(N(k+
poly(logN))) time to compute the support of an itemset;
for instance, the protocol given in [6] has the complexity
Ω(kN + N log3N). So, our quantum protocol is much
faster than classical protocols.
3. Communication complexity: In our quantum proto-
col, communication only happens in Steps 1, 3, 6 and 7,
and each time at most n + 1 qubits are sent. Thus the
communication cost of one application of controlled-G is
at most 4(n+1) = O(logN). Furthermore, as the whole
protocol calls controlled-G P times to compute supp(Z),
the total communicate complexity is O(logN) qubits for
each Z.
In contrast, in a classical protocol, since Alice and Bob
have to share uB(uA(S1)) and uA(uB(S2)), the communi-
cation bits required is Ω(N logN) [6, 8]. A comparison of
the time and communication complexities for the quan-
tum protocol presented in this Letter and those of three
popular classical protocols is given in Table II.
TABLE II. Comparison of complexities for classical and quan-
tum protocols.
Time Communication
Classical P. in [6] Ω(N log3 N +Nk) Ω(N logN) bits
Classical P. in [7] Ω(Nk) Ω(N) bits
Classical P. in [8]
Ω(poly(logN)N
+Nk)
Ω(N logN) bits
Quantum protocol O(k logN) O(logN) qubits
VI. Conclusion.—In this Letter, we developed a quan-
tum protocol for mining association rules on vertically
partitioned databases. An analysis shows that the quan-
tum protocol can better preserve the privacy than clas-
sical protocols, and at the same time it exponentially
reduces the time and communication complexities. For
the further research, we will explore the applications of
quantum computation in data mining of other knowledge
patterns. We will also consider how quantum computa-
tion can help in protecting privacy with other models of
dishonesties.
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